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ABSTRACT This paper contributes to the discussion surrounding interest groups
in the European Commission. We inspect the Commission’s lobbying register and
assess the density and diversity of the interest group population per policy
domain. The results suggest that while at the system level e ´lite pluralism with its pre-
ponderance of business interests is a credible hypothesis, this is not the case at the
sub-system level, where chameleon pluralism better conceptualizes variation of the
interest group populations as a function of the age of the Directorate General
(DG), capacity of the DG, nature of the policy domain, and involvement of
member states. Bridging theoretical considerations on input/output legitimacy
with informational approaches, we argue that different policy domains demand
different types of legitimacy that are supported by the provision of different types
of information (technical/political).
KEY WORDS Interest groups; information exchange; legitimacy; lobbying;
pluralism.
Today there is a vast European Union (EU) literature mapping the density of
lobbying activity in the EU (Berhkhout and Lowery 2010; Wonka et al.
2010) and a number of policy studies that seek to assess the impact of lobbyists
on EU policy formulation (Klu ¨ver 2011; Rasmussen 2012). While others follow
the multi-level policy process (Beyers and Kerremans 2007; Dur and Mateo
2010), few have sought to map the variance within the European Commission
and between Directorate Generals (DGs) across policy domains (Broscheid and
Coen 2007; Mahoney 2004).
Drawing on US models of informational lobbying exchange and variation in
lobbying activity across congressional policy committees (Baumgartner et al.
2009; Hall and Deardorff 2006), research on EU interest intermediation has
begun to recognize that there is variance in interest group activity across
policy domains (EU sub-systems) and European institutions (EU system).
This paper aims to contribute to this line of research by ﬁrst examining empiri-
cally the theoretical applicability of EU system-level conceptualizations of
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providing empirical evidence on the diversity of the interest group population
across policy domains, we develop an informational demand side model and
argue that there is variation in informational demands and legitimacy require-
ments by policy-makers across sub-systems. This in turn affects the diversity
and density of interest groups within DGs.
Finally, while we note the existence of e ´lite pluralism and preponderance of
business interests in lobbying the European Commission (Coen 1997, 1998;
Eising 2007), we also make an empirical argument that it is too simple to
posit that business groups dominate across all policy domains. Consequently,
we see interest group activity in the European Commission as a form of chame-
leon pluralism (Coen and Richardson 2009), where interest group type, density
and activity is a function of the policy type, age and capacity of the DGs respon-
sible for policy-making.
INFORMATIONAL LOBBYING EXCHANGES
We start from the assertion that different EU institutions demand different
types of information supplied by different types of interest groups (Bouwen
2002). Speciﬁcally, we recognize that the Commission does not have all the rel-
evant expertise or resources required for policy-making and that it demands
expertise (information) from interest groups and provides beneﬁts in exchange.
The beneﬁts provided can be: (i) direct, as in the case of policy impact; or (ii)
indirect, as in the case of information exchange about policy.
At the system level there would appear to have been a correlation between the
increasing informational demands of the EU policy process and increasing inter-
est groups (Coen and Richardson 2009). Yet at the sub-system level it is also
observable that resources vary across DGs, and the Commission can neither
provide inﬁnite beneﬁts to, nor process the information of the entire EU lobby-
ing population. Therefore the DGs form stronger (informal) ties with groups
that provide relevant and reliable information over time and unique interest
group clusters emerge across policy types (Broscheid and Coen 2003).
Moreover, recognizing that EU policy-making is more than a resources
exchange, we note that in order for the Commission to remain a relevant pol-
itical institution, and not just a quasi-regulatory agency, it needs to maintain
both its output and input legitimacy (Majone 2002, 2009; Scharpf 2009).
Output legitimacy is associated with the quality of policy and requires technical
expertise. Technical information assists in the design and implementation of
policy such as cost effectiveness. Input legitimacy is associated with the level
of public consensus and participation over policy, and requires political exper-
tise related to public consultations and public opinion. The more directly
accountable the institution (or policy) is to the public, the greater the need
for input legitimacy. The less directly accountable the institution (or policy)
is to the public, the higher the need for output legitimacy. The Commission,
a bureaucracy not directly accountable to the EU public through elections,
D. Coen & A. Katsaitis: Chameleon pluralism in the EU 1105will show overall greater demand for output legitimacy and technical expertise
(Neyer 2010).
Informational approaches are also used to explain interest group diversity.
Studies show that civil society groups such as non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) or social movement organizations (SMOs) supply expertise that is per-
ceived as political (Mahoney 2004; Warleigh 2001). Business interests, such as
ﬁrms and professional associations, supply expertise that is perceived astechnical
(Coen 1997, 1998; Eising 2007). That is not to say that civil society groups do
not or cannot provide technical information (Chalmers 2011, 2013), or
business interests cannot or do not provide political information (Coen
2009). What we argue is that, assuming actors provide a bundle of information
goods, business will be weighted towards technical provision and NGOs
towards the political information.
However, this distinction is not mutually exclusive, for example NGOs pro-
viding technical information for Climate Network Europe or ﬁrms providing
political information on wider public consultations to build reputations as
information providers over the long run. The legitimacy each category of
group brings is associated with the nature of the group (public vs. private)
and the information they provide overall (political vs. technical). Thus EU
policy-makers broadly seek out and encourage access from those groups they
perceive to bring the type of information that will help to legitimize the
policy they are seeking to formulate (Broscheid and Coen 2003; Chalmers
2013).
Accepting that the nature of the policy domain affects interest group density,
it is likely that it affects the demand for different types of legitimacy and infor-
mation. The absence of a detailed examination of policy domain interest group
diversity raises three issues. First, we have not tested whether EU system-level
theories apply to the sub-system level. Research assumes that e ´lite pluralism
applies across the entire system, including sub-systems. Second, this limits
our understanding on interest groups and the reasons behind their clustering
around speciﬁc policy domains. Third, the lack of empirical research looking
at variation in demand for input/output legitimacy and interest group diversity
across policy domains hasallowed discussions on the risk of institutional capture
by business to expand indiscriminately to the entire system.
The reality, as this paper attempts to empirically demonstrate, is that a new
complex form of chameleon pluralism has emerged within EU institutions.
In light of the increasing diversity of the interest group population in Brussels
and the dominance of business groups as a percentage of total activity (see
Figure 1), it is clear that the attempt to establish corporatism as the system of
interest intermediation failed to transpire (Streeck and Schmitter 1991).
Rather, proponents of e ´lite pluralism argue that business interests are the
largest group in Brussels and are the most successful at managing to form
pan-European alliances across most policy domains (Coen 1997, 1998;
Eising 2010). However, recognizing the diverse needs of policy domains and
the complexity of the policy-making process at the EU level, different types
1106 Journal of European Public Policyand numbers of interests can focus on different domains and different groups
can exert inﬂuence depending on the needs of the DGs.
We argue that this sub-system activity is not a form of neo-corporatism with
its formal access rules and hierarchy (Streeck and Schmitter 1991). Nor is it
Meso corporatism, which is seen as a defensive lobbying reaction of business
to structural adjustments (Grant 1987). Rather, we see a pluralist relationship
where access is generally restricted to interest groups that can meet the input/
output legitimacy requirements of the European Commission, and DGs ﬁlter
interest groups that can help them to formulate policy in their respective
policy domains (Broscheid and Coen 2003). Thus density, type and interest
activity in different DGs are a competitive and strategically advisable interest
group game constrained by the bureaucratic informational needs of the
policy. Noting the policy variation, ‘EU pluralism might be best characterised
as a kind of chameleon pluralism, capable of changing its appearance over
time during the policy cycle for a given policy problem or within a sub-sector
over a longer period of time’ (Richardson and Coen 2009: 348).
EU SUB-SYSTEM MODEL OF DIVERSITY AND DENSITY
In this section, we present variables that have an impact on informational diver-
sity across policy domains and therefore the chameleon lobbying exchange
between interests and institutions. We argue that these variables affect
demand for type of legitimacy and therefore informational type. In turn, this
has an effect on the policy domains’ interest group diversity. As the previous
section has discussed, the level of expertise, the length of time that interests
and institutions have been dealing with one another, the resource dependency
(capacity for exchange), the nature of the policy good, and the
Figure 1 Percentage of interest groups per type out of total
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density and the lobbying strategies. As such, we have identiﬁed four key vari-
ables that may affect the density and type of interest within the Commission:
(i) expertise and capacity as measured by the size of staff of the DG; (ii) the
type of policy domain (regulatory or distributive); (iii) the involvement of
national or sub-national government in the policy domain; and (iv) age, as cap-
tured by the date of establishment of the DG.
Expertise and capacity: staff size
Resources and in particular staff numbers are critical for bureaucracies to make
policy. In order to produce policy, DGs require staff to do research and go over
information supplied by interest groups. The more staff a DG has available, the
more man hours it can dedicate to its own research in order to promote its
agenda to other policy domains and/or institutions. In addition, larger
staffed DGs are likely to have a greater variation of opinion over policy
(Egeberg et al. 2003). In order to have a better understanding of public
opinion that will lead to publicly legitimate policy proposals and streamline
internal research, better staffed DGs demand more political information.
Smaller DGs by default can do less research than their better staffed counter-
parts. The ability to streamline information and address fully technical expertise
will be smaller since resources are limited. Therefore, smaller DGs are more
likely to demand technical information that is more complex and requires
more resources to produce.
H1a: DGs with greater numbers of staff have a greater concentration of inter-
est groups that supply political information.
H1b: DGs with smaller numbers of staff have a greater concentration of inter-
est groups that supply technical information.
POLICY MAKES POLITICS: NATURE OF THE POLICY DOMAIN
Broadly, policy domains can be divided into two categories, namely (i) regulat-
ory and (ii) (re-)distributive. Following from Lowi (1972), (re-)distributive
policy domains involve the transfer and redistribution of wealth and resources,
while regulatory policy domains administer and govern the conduct of relevant
actors such as business. The demand for technical information is higher for DGs
dealing with regulatory policy. First, in order to produce policy, DGs assess
available policy options that are not only complex but part of niche expertise.
They raise demand for technical information in order to ensure they will
collect as much available information as possible. Second, regulatory policy
domains are less politicized than distributive ones; input legitimacy plays a
smaller role than output legitimacy. Therefore demand for political expertise
is lower than demand for technical expertise. Distributive policy is less
complex but much more politicized (Christiansen 1997; Princen and
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itical information but overall reduces demand for technical information.
H2a: DGs managing regulatory policy domains have a greater concentration
of interest groups that supply technical information.
H2b: DGs managing distributive policy domains have a greater concentration
of interest groups that supply political information.
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
The extent of formal and informal involvement of national (and sub-national)
government in policy at the EU level impacts the informational demands of
DGs. Member states’ governments are either provided with expertise by interest
groups largely at the national level and/or can rely on their own national
agencies (ministries, bureaucracy) (Saurugger 2009). The additional formal/
informal involvement of member states in Brussels automatically increases the
politicization of the policy-making process; because more national perspectives
are available, the DG has greater demand for political information (Scharpf
2009). Therefore, DGs where member states are involved both informally
and formally show greater demand for political expertise. In policy domains
where there is less national government involvement, there is less politicization.
This reduces demand for input legitimacy and increases demand for output
legitimacy, raising demand for technical expertise, as issues are resolved at the
DG, the Committee of Permanent Representation (COREPER) or working
group level (Fouilleux et al. 2005).
H3a: DGs managing policy domains with greater member state involvement
have a greater concentration of interest groups that supply political infor-
mation.
H3b: DGs managing policy domains with less member state involvement will
haveagreaterconcentrationofinterestgroupsthatsupplytechnicalinfor-
mation.
Age and reputation building: date of establishment of DG
In order for a DG to become established and to establish expertise, it needs to
focus primarily on its policy output and secondarily on its input legitimacy
(Neyer 2010). We would expect older DGs to have established insider relation-
ships, as they have gone through a number of repeated games with compliant
and non-compliant interest groups and would have used their discretion to
exclude those seen to be misleading or untrustworthy (Broscheid and Coen
2003). This raises the quality of policy and output legitimacy, which allows
them to spend their resources on input legitimacy. Secondly, the strong presence
of insiders may cause institutional capture (Coen 2009). Thus ‘older’ DGs
demand political expertise and ‘access activity’ in order to defend against accu-
sations of capture. Newer DGs have gone through the policy-making process
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while the relevant interest groups are likely to be less experienced, which
increases demand for technical expertise in order to compare, select and raise
output legitimacy.
H4a: Older DGs have a greater concentration of interest groups that supply
political information.
H4b: Newer DGs have a greater concentration of interest groups that supply
technical information.
However, the relationship between date of establishment and concentration
of interest groups is ambiguous; NGOs in the 1960s were neither in the
same numbers nor as relevant in Brussels as they are today (Greenwood
2007). This has given business groups an advantage over NGOs in older
DGs, as they have had the chance to go over more iterated games and establish
insider relationships (Coen 2007). This allows for the earmarking of resources
for output legitimacy. Newer DGs offer a growing population of NGOs the
chance to enter the policy game more or less under equal conditions with in-
house groups, thus making it more likely for demand input legitimacy to
take place.
DATA
Information on the different types of interest groups and their policy domains of
interest was collected from the European Commission’s Register of Interest
Representatives (RIR) database. The RIR database at the time of collection con-
tained just over 4,000 registered interest groups (Commission of the European
Communities 2011).
The RIR contains four main categories of interest groups and 15 sub-cat-
egories; we examine only the main categories:
i) Professional Consultants/law ﬁrms; contains the above-mentioned actors.
ii) In-House; contains business interests such as companies and associations.
iii) NGO; contains civil society groups such as SMOs, NGOs and think tanks.
iv) Other; contains miscellaneous, mainly religious groups and regions.
We use the established DGs in order to deﬁne and operationalize the policy
domains of interest of the groups.
After accessing the RIR online, we collected information on the policy
domain of preference per type of interest group. Interest groups self-register
on the database as part of the Commission’s push for further transparency in
the policy-making process that takes place in Brussels (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities 2008). The interest groups that register provide detailed
information such as their name and address, select category of interest group
type (and sub-category), and select among 33 available policy domains the
ones they are interested in (lobby for). Interest groups can register as many
policy domains of preference as they wish. Because we utilize DGs in order
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options for registration is more than the DGs, some policy domains were col-
lected together. In most cases the available options are DGs broken down
into more than one policy domain. For the policy domains that were put
together, the data per type of group were collected as a combination of the
ﬁelds. Moreover, following this process some DGs that were similar and con-
tained too few interest groups were also grouped together; the data were col-
lected in the same way. This ensures that all information is gathered in the
same manner and guarantees the validity of the data. For our inferential analysis
the diversity of type of interest group per policy domain is operationalized as the
percentage of type of interest group, as available by the database, over the total
number of interests per policy domain. Because the data provide only a snapshot
of the interest group population, we are interested in the relative position of type
of interest group with respect both to the policy domain and the independent
variables. We present this information in more detail in the next section.
Next, we collected data on the DGs that are used to operationalize the inde-
pendent variables: (i) staff and (ii) date of establishment of each DG. This infor-
mation was available on the Commission’s website. The variables are
continuous. For the other two variables, (i) type of policy and (ii) involvement
of national/sub-national government in policy domain, we have coded these
variablesasdummies:(i)typeofpolicy(distributive1,regulatory0);(ii)national
government (involvement 1, non-involvement 0). We recognize that in some
cases it is difﬁcult to allocate a DG to only one speciﬁc category, for example
environment, but here we made a value judgement that the preponderance of
activity was of a certain type. For the DGs that were put together, the number
of staff was added, the date of establishment was either the same or averaged.
In coding the involvement of member states in policy domains, we drew on
the original coding of Broscheid and Coen (2007), who in turn use qualiﬁed
majority voting (QMV) in the policy domains as an indicator. Accepting that
the Lisbon Treaty altered the degree of delegation and state involvement in
some policy domains, the authors looked at the formal deﬁnitions of member
state involvement in policy-making in Brussels, such as competences and
modes of governance (Naurin and Wallace 2008) to create the ﬁnal codes.
We have coded member state involvement based on the relative additional
informal discussions/interference taking place across policy domains in Brussels
with member state interest. Following this, we cross-examined our positioning
with the relevant literature (see Fouilleux et al. 2005; Pollack 2000; Reh et al.
2010). That is to say, the ‘involvement’ of member states in a policy domain
expresses the additional interest and pressure provided by member states in
policy domains.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Figure 1 illustrates that the EU system is dominated by two categories of interest
groups: In-House and NGO. Out of the 4,007 interest groups registered, 1,903
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egory; the remainder is divided between Other (15 per cent) and Professional
Consultants (7 per cent). This reafﬁrms previous empirical observations
about interest group diversity at the EU system level (Wonka et al. 2010). It
also provides provisional support for the assertion that the Commission’s
utility of different types of information is contingent on input and output legiti-
macy. That is to say that the Commission has a higher demand for output legiti-
macy and therefore technical regulatory information which is supplied by In-
House type groups. Conversely, the European Commission has a lower
demand for input legitimacy as mirrored in the smaller number of NGO
type groups.
Second, the data provide validity for system-level e ´lite pluralism as a concep-
tualization of the interest intermediation in Brussels. Although the number of
interest groups has increased over the years, business groups have fared much
better than others. This becomes even more evident when we look further
into the main two categories of interests. The In-House category involves
mostly companies and professional associations (84.5 per cent; 1,566) of the
category. The NGO category includes mostly NGOs (civil society groups)
(78.8 per cent; 982).
The smaller number of other groups suggests that their information is in less
demand and may be the consequence of being intermediary groups, rather than
primary actors interfacing with the public and consumers. For example, law
ﬁrms and professional consultancies essentially provide services for parts of
the rest of the interest group population and, moreover, do not have infor-
mation to provide to the Commission directly. Secondly, they have fewer incen-
tives to register on the RIR. Remaining informal (outside of the database)
empowers their insider/outsider status, making them harder to detect and regu-
late. In the Other category we ﬁnd mostly regions and religious groups. With
respect to regions, relevant informational demands can be covered by two differ-
ent actors instead. Firstly, the Committee of Regions can streamline the infor-
mation available from regions; secondly national governments are better in
gathering information from regions and stronger lobbying targets for regions.
Nevertheless, the system includes a respectable amount of NGO type groups
– nearly a third, a percentage higher than that in the late 1990s. Thus there are
indications that input legitimacy has a role to play and it is increasing over time,
although not enough to tip the balance at the EU system level (Bellamy 2010).
The number of interests surrounding Brussels and the Commission has grown
drastically but output legitimacy has higher utility overall and ﬁrms and associ-
ations have the expertise demanded. This leads us to our central point of analy-
sis, as this is not the case at the sub-system level, as indicated across the different
policy domains in Figure 2.
The snapshot changes when we look at Figure 2 in detail. First, arguments
and empirical evidence on the system level do not apply across the sub-
system level. This goes against previous studies that assumed that the dominance
of business interests applies across all policy domains. The diversity of the
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ation appears to come as a result of the variables we have identiﬁed to have
an impact on the DGs’ demand for different types of information. Second,
in agreement with previous studies, the density of the population across
policy domains varies (Broscheid and Coen 2007).
As expected, policy domains that largely demand more input legitimacy and
political information have a larger percentage of NGO type groups than In-
House. The DGs managing them are distributive, have more staff and have
greater government involvement. For example, DG Development (DEVCO)
Figure 2 Number of interest groups per type per policy domain (starting from earliest
established DG)
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education and culture (EAC) has 41 per cent and 33 per cent respectively; in
human rights (ECHO) more than half of its population (55 per cent) is
NGO type groups, overrunning in absolute numbers all other type groups.
Conversely, policy domains that demand more output legitimacy and more
technical information are regulatory, with less staff and member state involve-
ment. They show a greater percentage of In-House groups. For example, in
the Common Market (MARKT) ﬁeld 70 per cent of the category are In-
House interests; the economics (ECFIN) and energy (ENER) ﬁelds have 60
per cent and 54 per cent respectively. However, policy domains are complex;
when the demand for different types of legitimacy becomes more mixed, the
diversity of the population follows. For example, the agricultural ﬁeld
(AGRI) has nearly an equal concentration of In-House groups and NGOs, as
it is not purely a distributive ﬁeld but also includes a lot of regulatory policies.
The results do not support hypothesis 4, with In-House groups appearing in
larger numbers in older DGs. Most of those established before the 1960s show a
larger concentration of In-House groups than NGOs. This can be justiﬁed as a
result of business interests having more chances to enter into repeated games
with these DGs and become insiders, earmarking resources for output legiti-
macy and technical information. In addition, most of these DGs are regulatory,
which by default demands more technical information. Distributive ones such
as AGRI or EMPL show higher percentages of NGO groups in comparison to
the others. Moreover, in DGs established after the 1960s the percentage of
NGOs increases. This could be the result of a growing NGO population that
could counterbalance the dominance of business interests, as well as a maturing
EU polity where input legitimacy plays a growing role.
A closer examination of the variance of the groups shows that overall In-
House groups have a more stable presence across policy domains. However,
NGO groups drastically increase in policy domains where demand for political
information is likely to be greater, while In-House groups are reduced. This
could be explained by the fact that because resources (beneﬁts) are limited,
demand for one type of information can reduce demand for another. Moreover,
the more stable presence of In-House interest groups suggests that output legiti-
macy has a higher and more stable utility for the Commission across policy
domains. The demand for input legitimacy is more volatile across policy
domains.
This, ﬁrstly, shows that EU system-level theories need to be adapted to the
evolving EU sub-system. We see an interchangeable form of pluralism across
the EU sub-systems, with variation depending on legitimacy and informational
demands. Thus it is no longer applicable to argue that interest representation in
Brussels is a form of e ´lite pluralism dominated by business; rather in the 2010s
the conceptualization of chameleon pluralism is more relevant and shows the
maturing Brussels polity.
Secondly, in accepting the greater variety of interest styles in the policy
process, we add to the understanding of the EU formulation and agenda
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complex and evolving thus moves us to a more nuanced understanding of the
concerns of business institutional capture in the EU policy-making process.
As civil society groups provide input legitimacy, and may actually outnumber
business interests in some cases, it is possible that in these policy domains dis-
cussions on business capture are inﬂated.
In the following section we move into our inferential analysis in order to
examine the causal relations identiﬁed in more detail. Speciﬁcally we regress
the dependent variable (percentage of type of group out of the total per
policy domain) on the independent variables. Parameter estimates obtained
via OLS are presented in Tables 1 and 2. We focus on the largest groups of
the population, namely In-House and NGO. The causal relationships show
in the data established that policy domains that have greater demand for
output legitimacy, operationalized as DGs with: i) national government invol-
vement; ii) are distributive; iii) are established for longer; iv) have more staff,
will have a greater clustering of NGO type groups and therefore positive corre-
lation. In-House type groups will cluster less around them and more around
DGs with the opposite characteristics and therefore show a negative correlation
The explanatory power of the model is good and the coefﬁcients are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. As the p-values indicate, all coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁ-
cant at the 97 per cent level or above, except for DG staff size at the regression of
NGO interests which is signiﬁcant at the 92 per cent level. The magnitude of
the coefﬁcients depends on the units of measurement, therefore their quantitat-
ive impact should be interpreted accordingly. Consider, for example, the last
regression (percentage of NGO interests). National Government and Distribu-
tive Policy Domain are dummy variables, so their quantitative impact is given
by the coefﬁcients. DG Staff Size is the actual number of staff, therefore an
increase of staff by 100 people increases the percentage of NGOs by 0.016
(0.016 ¼ 0.00016∗100). DG Establishment is measured as 2011 minus year
of establishment. Therefore, a DG that has been established for ten years
reduces the percentage of NGOs by 0.03.
Table 1 OLS regression of percentage of In House interests
Variable Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-Statistic p-values.
C 0.493794 0.052251 9.450394 0.0000
National Government 20.076987 0.029823 22.581419 0.0178
Distributive Policy Domain 20.080790 0.034553 22.338178 0.0299
DG Establishment 0.004721 0.001063 4.440582 0.0003
DG Staff Size 20.000218 9.28E-05 22.346164 0.0294
R-squared 0.588118 Mean dependent var 0.488287
Adjusted R-squared 0.505742 S.D. dependent var 0.127499
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ameter estimates for National Government indicate that the involvement of
national (and sub-national) government in the policy process of speciﬁc
policy domains reduces the clustering of groups that provide technical infor-
mation (In-House), but it increases that of groups that provide political infor-
mation (NGO). This can be attributed to the fact that member states supply
their own technical information, which they have either acquired from business
interests at the national level or their bureaucracies, causing limited demand for
technical expertise in Brussels. At the same time the higher politicization of the
policy domain requires more political information in order to establish consen-
sus.
Distributive policy appears to drive away In-House lobbyists but attract
NGO group types. In highly politicized domains the Commission demands
political information in order to build up input legitimacy. Moreover, distribu-
tive policy is less complex than regulatory policy, which explains the reduction
in In-House groups and theincrease inNGO type groups that can provide more
political information. Finally, it suggests that contrary to supply side arguments,
NGOs will lobby not only within the national realm but also at the EU level.
As we have discussed above, the relationship between date of establishment of
a DG and concentration of interest group is ambiguous. The positive relation-
ship for In-House interests and the negative for NGOs can be justiﬁed consid-
ering the population of both groups in Brussels in the 1960s. In-House groups
have had a head start in comparison to NGOs. Through repeated games, In-
House groups managed to gain trust and ring-fence older DGs when NGOs
were in smaller numbers. Older, more experienced DGs already have insider
circles that provide them with expertise on technical information and have ear-
marked more resources for them.
It also appears that better staffed DGs, operationalized as number of staff per
DG (logged), attract more NGO type groups while smaller ones attract In-
House groups. Better staffed DGs are better able to manage and even
produce their own technical information, such as reports, studies and so on.
This allows them to produce high-quality policy, which increases their output
Table 2 OLS regression of percentage of NGO interests
Variable Coefﬁcient Std. Error t-Statistic p-values.
C 0.275193 0.048192 5.710333 0.0000
National Government 0.055875 0.024212 2.307731 0.0318
Distributive Policy Domain 0.065641 0.027608 2.377622 0.0275
DG Establishment 20.003282 0.000885 23.708478 0.0014
DG Staff Size 0.000161 8.65E-05 1.857195 0.0781
R-squared 0.511286 Mean dependent var 0.290268
Adjusted R-squared 0.413544 S.D. dependent var 0.100978
1116 Journal of European Public Policylegitimacy, and spend resources in order to increase their input legitimacy. This
encourages the clustering of NGO type groups. On the opposite side, In-House
type groups will avoid well-staffed DGs and go after those with less staff as they
require more technical expertise in order to retain output legitimacy.
CONCLUSIONS
The results largely conﬁrmed our hypotheses; policy domains that place higher
utility on output legitimacy demand more technical expertise and as a result
show a stronger presence of business interests and associations. On the other
hand, policy domains that place higher utility on input legitimacy demand more
political information and show a stronger presence of civil society type groups.
Nevertheless, our results conﬁrm previous studies’ conceptualizations of interest
group intermediation and population diversity at the system level (Wonka et al.
2010), as well as density at the sub-system level (Broscheid and Coen 2007).
This paper has three main implications. First, from a theoretical perspective
we have linked legitimacy considerations with informational approaches. This
connects ‘what’ type of information and ‘why’ it is demanded with ‘who’
supplies it. Second, the paper provides empirical evidence that shows the diver-
sity of the interest group population across policy domains and variables that
affect it. Third, it shows that EU system-level conceptualizations such as e ´lite
pluralism, although still applicable at the system level, do not apply at the
sub-system level. Thus the reality that we observe is a form of chameleon plur-
alism and the ﬂexibility it offers deﬁnes much better the existing interest rep-
resentation model for the EU sub-system level. Thirdly, we have a more ﬁne-
grained analysis of the regulatory state relationship between regulator and reg-
ulatee that perhaps allows us to create a more nuanced micro contribution to the
institutional capture debates. However, further research is needed in order to
clarify the ‘active’ representativeness of these groups and the diversity of sub-
systems across different institutions.
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